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  The publication of Daniel Kahneman’s book,  Thinking, Fast and Slow, is a major intellectual 
event.   The book summarizes, but also integrates, the research that Kahneman has done over the past 
40 years, beginning with his path-breaking work with the late Amos Tversky.  The broad theme of this 
research is that human beings are intuitive thinkers and that human intuition is imperfect, with the 
result  that  judgments  and  choices  often  deviate  substantially  from  the  predictions  of  normative 
statistical and economic models.  This research has had a major impact on psychology, but also on such 
diverse areas of economics as public finance, labor economics, development, and finance.  The broad 
field of behavioral economics – perhaps the most important conceptual innovation in economics over 
the  last  30  years  –  might  not  have  existed  without  Kahneman  and  Tversky’s  (hereafter,  KT’s) 
fundamental work.  It certainly could not have existed in anything like its current form.  The publication 
of Kahneman’s book will bring to an even broader audience of economists some of the most innovative 
and fundamental ideas of 20
th century social science.     
  In this review, I discuss some broad ideas and themes of the book.   Although it would be 
relatively easy to carry on in the spirit of the first paragraph, constrained only by my limited vocabulary 
of adjectives, I will seek to accomplish a bit more.  First, because the book mentions few economic 
                                                           
1 Department of Economics, Harvard University. I have benefitted from generous comments of Nicholas Barberis, 
Pedro Bordalo, Thomas Cunningham, Nicola Gennaioli, Matthew Gentzkow, Owen Lamont, Sendhil Mullainathan, 
Josh Schwartzstein, Jesse Shapiro, Tomasz Strzalecki, Dmitry Taubinsky, Richard Thaler, and Robert Vishny.  They 
are not, however, responsible for the views expressed in this review.  I do not cite specific papers of Kahneman 
when the material is described in the book.   
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applications, I will describe some of the economic research that has been substantially influenced by this 
work.  My feeling is that the most profound influence of KT’s work on economics has been in finance, on 
what has now become the field of behavioral finance taught in dozens of undergraduate and graduate 
economics  programs,  as well  as  at  business  schools.    I  learned  about KT’s work  in  the 1980s  as  a 
graduate student, and it influenced my own work in behavioral finance enormously.   
Second, I believe that while KT’s work has opened many doors for economic research, some of the 
fundamental  issues  it  raised  remain  work  in  progress.    I  will  thus  discuss  what  Kahneman’s  work 
suggests  for  decision  theory,  primarily  as  I  see  it  through  the  lens  of  my  recent  work  with  Nicola 
Gennaioli and Pedro Bordalo (Gennaioli and Shleifer 2010, Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012a,b,c).   
Before turning to the book, let me briefly address the two common objections to the introduction of 
psychology into economics, which have been bandied around for as long as the field has existed.  The 
first objection holds that, while psychological quirks may influence individual decisions at the boundary, 
the  standard  economic  model  describes  first  order  aspects  of  human  behavior  adequately,  and 
economists should focus on “first order things” rather than quirks.  Contrary to this objection, Della 
Vigna (2010) summarizes a great deal of evidence of large and costly errors people make in important 
choices.  Let me illustrate.  First, individuals pay large multiples of actuarially fair value to buy insurance 
against small losses, as well as to reduce their deductibles (Sydnor 2010).  In the standard model, such 
choices imply astronomical levels of risk aversion.  Second, the standard economic view that persuasion 
is conveyance of information seems to run into a rather basic problem that advertising is typically 
emotional, associative, and misleading – yet nonetheless effective (Bertrand et al. 2010, Della Vigna and 
Gentzkow  2010,  Mullainathan  et  al.  2008).      Third,  after  half  a  century  of  teaching  by  financial 
economists that investors should pick low-cost index funds, only a minority do, while most select high 
cost actively managed funds that underperform those index funds.  These kinds of behavior matter for  
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both prices and resource allocation.  Explaining such behavior with the standard model is possible, but 
requires intellectual contortions that are definitely not “first order.”   
The second objection holds that market forces eliminate the influence of psychological factors on 
prices and allocations.  One version of this argument, made forcefully by Milton Friedman (1953) in the 
context  of  financial  markets,  holds  that  arbitrage bring  prices  and  therefore  resource  allocation  to 
efficient levels.  Subsequent research has shown, however, that Friedman’s argument – while elegant – 
is theoretically (and practically) incorrect.  Real-world arbitrage is costly and risky, and hence limited 
(see, e.g., Grossman and Miller 1988, DeLong et al 1990, Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  Dozens of empirical 
studies confirm that, even in markets with relatively inexpensive arbitrage, identical, or nearly identical, 
securities trade at different prices.   With costlier arbitrage, pricing is even less efficient.   
A second version of the “forces of rationality” objection holds that participants in real markets are 
specialists invulnerable to psychological quirks.  John List’s (2003) finding that professional baseball card 
traders do not exhibit the so-called endowment effect is supportive of this objection.  The problem with 
taking this too far is that individuals make lots of critical decisions – how much to save, how to invest, 
what to buy – on their own, without experts.  Even when people receive expert help, the incentives of 
experts are often to take advantage of psychological biases of their customers.  Financial advisors direct 
savers to expensive, and often inappropriate, products, rather than telling them to invest in index funds 
(Chalmers and Reuter 2012, Gennaioli et al. 2012).  Market forces often work to strengthen, rather than 
to eliminate, the influence of psychology.      
    
 
4 
 
 
I.  System 1 and System 2. 
Kahneman’s  book  is organized  around  the metaphor of  System  1 and  System  2,  adopted  from 
Stanovich and West (2000).  As the title of the book suggests, System 1 corresponds to thinking fast, and 
System  2  to  thinking  slow.    Kahneman  describes  System  1  in  many  evocative  ways:  it  is  intuitive, 
automatic,  unconscious,  and  effortless,  it  answers  questions  quickly  through  associations  and 
resemblances, it is non-statistical, gullible, and heuristic.   System 2 in contrast is what economists think 
of as thinking: it is conscious, slow, controlled, deliberate, effortful, statistical, suspicious and lazy (costly 
to use).  Much of KT’s research deals with system 1 and its consequences for decisions people make.  For 
Kahneman, System 1 describes “normal” decision making.  System 2, like the US Supreme Court, checks 
in only on occasion.    
Kahneman does not suggest that people are incapable of System 2 thought and always follow their 
intuition.  System 2 engages when circumstances require.  Rather, many of our actual choices in life, 
including some important and consequential ones, are System 1 choices, and therefore are subject to 
substantial deviations from the predictions of the standard economic model.  System 1 leads to brilliant 
inspirations, but also to systematic errors.   
To illustrate, consider one of KT’s most compelling questions/experiments:  
An  individual  has  been  described  by  a  neighbor  as  follows:  “Steve  is  very  shy  and  withdrawn, 
invariably helpful but with very little interest in people or in the world of reality.  A meek and tidy soul, 
he has a need for order and structure, and a passion for detail.”  Is Steve more likely to be a librarian or 
a farmer? 
Most people reply quickly that Steve is more likely to be a librarian than a farmer.  This is surely 
because Steve resembles a librarian more than a farmer, and associative memory quickly creates a  
 
5 
 
picture of Steve in our minds that is very librarian-like.  What we do not think of in answering the 
question is that there are 5 times as many farmers as librarians in the US, and that the ratio of male 
farmers  to male  librarians  is  even  higher  (this certainly  did  not occur to  me  when  I  first  read  the 
question many years ago, and does not even occur to me now as I reread it, unless I force myself to 
remember).  The base rates simply do not come to mind and thus prevent an accurate computation and 
answer, namely that Steve is more likely to be a farmer.  System 2 does not engage. 
In another example (due to Shane Frederick), one group of respondents is asked (individually) to 
estimate the total number of murders in Detroit in a year.  Another group is asked to estimate the total 
number of murders in Michigan in a year.   Typically, the first group on average estimates a higher 
number of murders than the second.  Again, System 1 thinking is in evidence.  Detroit evokes a violent 
city, associated with many murders.  Michigan evokes idyllic apple-growing farmland.  Without System 2 
engagement,  the  fact  that  Detroit  is  in  Michigan  does  not  come  to mind  for  the  second  group  of 
respondents, leading – across subjects – to a dramatic violation of basic logic.  
Kahneman’s other examples of System 1 thinking include adding 2 + 2, completing the words “bread 
and …,” and driving a car on an empty road.   Calling all these examples System 1 thinking captures the 
rapid, intuitive, automatic response, which usually gets the right answer, but sometimes – as with Steve 
and murders in Michigan – does not.   Yet unfortunately things are not as clear as they look, once we 
apply our own System 2 thinking to System 1.  
First, as Kahneman readily recognizes, the domains of System 1 and System 2 differ across people.  
For most (all?) readers of this review, computing 20 X 20 is a System 1 effortless task, largely because 
economists have both been selected to be good at it and have had lots of practice.   But for many people 
who are not experts, this operation is effortful, or even impossible, and is surely the domain of System  
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2.    In contrast, screwing in a light bulb is very system 2 for me – conscious, effortful and slow – but not 
so for most people, I gather.  As people gain knowledge or expertise, the domains of the two systems 
change.  In fact, the classification of decisions into products of System 1 and System 2 thinking seems to 
be even harder.  Go back to murders in Detroit and in Michigan.  The question surely evoked images of 
bombed-out Detroit and pastoral Michigan, but constructing the estimate also requires a substantial 
mental effort.   Both systems seem to be in action.   
  Second, the challenge of going beyond the labels is that System 2 is not perfect, either.   Many 
people would get 20 X 20 wrong, even if they think hard about it.   The idea that conscious thought and 
computation are imperfect goes back at least to Herbert Simon and his concept of bounded rationality.   
Bounded rationality is clearly important for many problems (and in fact has been fruitfully explored by 
economists),  but  it  is  very  different  from  Kahneman’s  System  1.    Kahneman’s  brilliant  insight  – 
illustrated again and again throughout the book – is that people do not just get hard problems wrong, as 
bounded rationality would predict; they get utterly trivial problems wrong because they don’t think of 
them in the right way.   This is a very different notion than bounded rationality.  Still, the challenge 
remains that when we see a decision error, it is not obvious whether to attribute it to System 1 thinking, 
System 2 failure, or a combination.   
Third,  the  classification  of  thought  into  System  1  and  System  2  raises  tricky  questions  of  the 
relationship  between  the  two.    Because  System  1  includes  unconscious  attention,  perception,  and 
associative  memory,  much  of  the  informational  input  that  System  2  receives  comes  via  System  1.   
Whether and how System 1 sends “up” the message if at all is a bit unclear.  In other words, what 
prompts the engagement of System 2?  What would actually trigger thinking about relative numbers of 
male librarians and farmers in the United States, or even whether Michigan includes Detroit?  I am not 
sure  that  anything  but  a  hint  would  normally  do  it.    Perhaps  System  2  is  almost  always  at  rest.   
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Furthermore,  one  function  of  System  2  appears  to  be  to  “check  the  answers”  of  System  1,  but  if 
information “sent up” is incomplete and distorted, how would System 2 know?  To strain the legal 
analogy a bit further, appellate courts in the US must accept fact finding of trial courts as given, so many 
errors – as well as deliberate distortions – creep in precisely at the fact-finding trial stage, rather than in 
the appealable application of law to the facts.  Kahneman writes that “the division of labor between 
System 1 and System 2 is highly efficient: it minimizes effort and optimizes performance (p. 25)”.  I am 
not sure why he says so.  If System 1 guides our insurance and investment choices described in the 
introduction, then System 2 seems rather disengaged even when the costs of disengagement are high.    
To put these comments differently, each of System 1 and System 2 appears to be a collection of 
distinct mental processes.  System 1 includes unconscious attention, perception, emotion, memory, 
automatic causal narratives, etc.  I am worried that, once the biology of thought is worked out, what 
actually happens in our heads is unlikely to neatly map into fast and slow thinking.  The classification is 
an incredibly insightful and helpful metaphor, but it is not a biological construct or an economic model.   
Turning metaphors into models remains a critical challenge.  
 
II.  Heuristics and Biases.  
One of the two main bodies of KT’s work has come to be known as “Heuristics and Biases.”  This 
research deals, broadly, with intuitive statistical prediction.  The research finds that individuals use 
heuristics or rules of thumb to solve statistical problems, which often leads to biased estimates and 
predictions.  KT have identified a range of now famous heuristics, which fall into two broad categories.   
Some heuristics involve respondents answering questions for which they do not have much idea 
about the correct answer, and must retrieve a guess from their memory.  The problem given to them is  
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not self-contained.  As a consequence, respondents grasp at straws, and allow their answers to be 
influenced by objectively irrelevant frames.  One example of this is the anchoring heuristic.   A wheel of 
fortune, marked from 0 to 100, is rigged by experimenters to stop only at either 10 or 65.  After a spin, 
students  write  down  the  number  at  which  it  stopped,  and  are  then  asked  two  questions:  Is  the 
percentage of African nations among UN members larger or smaller than the number you just wrote?  
What is your best guess of the percentage of African nations in the UN?  For students who saw the 
wheel of fortune stop at 10, the average guess was 25%.  For those who saw it stop at 65, the average 
guess was 45%.  Similar experiments have been run with lengths of rivers, heights of mountains, and so 
on.  The first question anchors the answer to the second.  Kahneman interprets anchoring as an extreme 
example of System 1 thinking: planting a number in one’s head renders it relevant to fast decisions.     
The second category of heuristics is much closer to economics, and in fact has received a good deal 
of attention from economists.    These heuristics describe statistical problems in which respondents 
receive  all  the  information  they  need,  but  nonetheless  do  not  use  it  correctly.    Not  all  available 
information seems to come to the top of the mind, leading to errors.  Examples of neglected decision-
relevant information include base rates (even when they are explicitly stated), low probability but non-
salient events, and chance.   The finding that the causal and associative System 1 does not come up with 
chance as an explanation seems particularly important.  Kahneman recalls a magnificent story of Israeli 
Air Force officers explaining to him that being tough with pilots worked miracles, because when pilots 
had a poor landing and got yelled at, their next landing was better, but when they had a great landing 
and got praised, their next landing was worse.  To these officers, the role of chance and consequent 
mean reversion in landing quality did not come to mind as an explanation.   
The best known problems along these lines describe the representativeness heuristic, of which the 
most tantalizing is Linda, here slightly abbreviated:  
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Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright.  She majored in philosophy.   As a 
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated 
in anti-nuclear demonstrations.   
After  seeing  the  description,  the  respondents  are  asked  to  rank  in  order  of  likelihood  various 
scenarios:  Linda is 1) an elementary school teacher, 2) active in the feminist movement, 3) a bank teller, 
4) an insurance salesperson, and 5) a bank teller also active in the feminist movement.   The remarkable 
finding is that (now generations of) respondents deem scenario 5) more likely than scenario 3), even 
though 5) is a special case of 3).  The finding thus violates the most basic laws of probability theory.  Not 
only do many students get the Linda problem wrong, but some object, sometimes passionately, after 
the correct answer is explained.  
What’s  going  on  here?    The  description  of  Linda  brings  to  mind,  presumably  from  associative 
memory, a picture that does not look like a bank teller.  Asked to judge the likelihood of scenarios, 
respondents automatically match that picture to each of these scenarios, and judge 5) to be more 
similar to Linda than 3).   System 1 rather easily tells a story for scenario 5), in which Linda is true to her 
beliefs by being active in the feminist movement, yet must work as a bank teller to pay rent.   Telling 
such a story for 3) that puts all the facts together is more strenuous because a stereotypical bank teller 
is not a college radical.  The greater similarity of Linda to the feminist bank teller leads respondents to 
see that a more likely scenario than merely a bank teller.   
Many studies have unsuccessfully tried to debunk Linda.   It is certainly true that if you break Linda 
down for respondents (there are 100 Lindas, some are bank tellers, some are feminist bank tellers, 
which ones are there more of?) – if you engage their System 2 – you can get the right answer.  But this, 
of course, misses the point, namely that, left to our own devices, we do not engage in such breakdowns.  
System 2 is asleep.  In Linda, as in Steve the librarian and many other experiments, the full statistical  
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problem simply does not come to mind, and fast-thinking respondents – even when they do strain a bit 
– arrive at an incorrect answer. 
There have been several attempts by economists to model such intuitive statistics (e.g. Mullainathan 
2000, 2002, Rabin 2002, Rabin and Vayanos 2010, Schwartzstein 2010).   In one effort that sought to 
stay close to Kahneman’s System 1 reasoning,  Gennaioli and  I (2010)  argued that  individuals solve 
decision  problems  by  representing  them  –  automatically  but  incompletely  --  in  ways that  focus on 
features that are statistically more associated with the object being assessed.  In the Linda problem, the 
feminist bank teller is described comprehensively and hence represented as a feminist bank teller.  A 
bank teller, in contrast, is not described comprehensively, and bank teller evokes the stereotype of a 
non-feminist because not being a feminist is relatively more associated with being a bank teller than 
being a feminist.  The decision maker thus compares the likelihoods not of bank teller vs feminist bank 
teller, but rather of the stereotypical (representative) non-feminist bank teller vs feminist bank teller, 
and concludes that Linda the college radical is more likely to be the latter.   This approach turns out to 
account for a substantial number of heuristics discussed in Kahneman’s book.   The key idea, though, is 
very much in the spirit of System 1 thinking, but made tractable using economic modeling, namely that 
to make judgments we represent the problem automatically via the functioning of attention, perception, 
and memory, and our decisions are subsequently distorted by such representation.   
The representativeness heuristic had a substantial impact on behavioral finance, largely because it 
provides a natural account of extrapolation – the expectation by investors that trends will continue.  The 
direct evidence on investor expectations of stock returns points to a strong extrapolative component 
(e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen 2003).  Extrapolation has been used to understand price bubbles (Kindleberger 
1978), but also the well-documented overvaluation and subsequent reversal of high performing growth 
stocks (De Bondt and Thaler 1985, Lakonishok et al 1994).  Indeed, data for a variety of securities across  
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markets show that price trends continue over a period of several months (the so-called momentum), 
but that extreme performance reverts over longer periods (Cutler, Poterba, and Summers 1991).  Even 
more dramatically, investors put money into well performing mutual funds, into stock funds and stock 
market-linked insurance products after the stock market has done well (Frazzini and Lamont 2008, 
Yagan  2012).      Such  phenomena  have  been  described  colorfully  as  investors  “jumping  on  the 
bandwagon” believing that “the trend is your friend,” and failing to realize that “trees do not grow to 
the sky,” that “what goes up must come down,” etc.  
Heuristics provide a natural way of thinking about these phenomena, and can be incorporated into 
formal models of financial markets (see, e.g., Barberis et al. 1998).  Specifically, when investors pour 
money into hot, well-performing assets, they may feel that these assets are similar to, or resemble, 
other assets that have kept going up.  Many high tech stocks look like the next Google, or at least 
System 1 concludes that they do.   Extrapolation is thus naturally related to representativeness, and 
supports the relevance of Kahneman’s work not just in the lab, but also in the field.  
 
III.   Prospect Theory.  
Prospect Theory has been KT’s most influential contribution, and deservedly so.  In a single paper, 
the authors proposed an alternative to standard theory of choice under risk that was at the same time 
quite radical and tractable, used the theory to account for a large number of outstanding experimental 
puzzles, and designed and implemented a collection of new experiments used to elucidate and test the 
theory.  In retrospect, it is difficult to believe just how much that paper had accomplished, how new it 
was, and how profound its impact has been on behavioral economics.   
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Prospect Theory rests on four fundamental assumptions.  First, risky choices are evaluated in terms 
of their gains and losses relative to a reference point, which is usually the status quo wealth.  Second, 
individuals  are  loss  averse,  meaning  extremely  risk  averse  with  respect  to  small  bets  around  the 
reference point.  Third, individuals are risk averse in the domain of gains, and risk loving in the domain 
of losses.  And finally, in assessing lotteries, individuals convert objective probabilities into decision 
weights that over-weight low probability events and under-weight high probability ones.   
The first assumption is probably the most radical one.  It holds that rather than integrating all risky 
choices into final wealth states, as standard theory requires, individuals frame and evaluate risky bets 
narrowly in terms of their gains and losses relative to a reference point.   In their 1979 paper, KT did not   
dwell on what the reference point is, but for the sake of simplicity took it to be the current wealth.  In a 
1981 Science paper, however, they went much further in presenting a very psychological view of the 
reference point: “The reference outcome is usually a state to which one has adapted; it is sometimes set 
by social norms and expectations; it sometimes corresponds to a level of aspiration, which may or may 
not be realistic (p. 456).”  The reference point is thus left as a rather unspecified part of KT’s theory, 
their  measure  of  “context”  in  which  decisions  are  made.    Koszegi  and  Rabin  (2006)  suggest  that 
reference  points  should  be  rational  expectations  of  future  consumption,  a  proposal  that  brings  in 
calculated thought.  Pope and Schweizer (2011) find that goals serve as reference points in professional 
golf.   Hart and Moore (2008) believe that contracts serve as reference points for future negotiations.  A 
full elaboration of where reference points come from is still “under construction.”   
  The  second  assumption  of  Prospect  Theory  is  loss  aversion.    It  is  inspired  by  a  basic  and 
intuitively appealing experiment in which people refuse to take bets that give them a 60% probability of 
winning  a  dollar  and  a  40%  probability  of  losing  a  dollar,  even  though  such  a  refusal  implies  an 
implausibly high level of risk aversion (Rabin 2000).  Kahneman justifies this assumption by noting that,  
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biologically, losses might be processed in part in the amygdala in the same way as threats.  KT modeled 
this assumption as a kink in the value function around the reference point.  In fact, in its simplest 
version,  Prospect  Theory  (without  assumptions  3  and  4  described  below)  is  occasionally  presented 
graphically with a piecewise linear value function, with the slope of 1 above the origin and 2 below the 
origin  (reference  point),  and  a  kink  at  the  origin  that  captures  loss  aversion.    Kahneman  sees  loss 
aversion  as  the  most  important  contribution  of  Prospect  Theory  to  behavioral  economics,  perhaps 
because it has been used to account for the endowment effect (the finding, both in the lab and in the 
field, that individuals have a much higher reservation price for an object they own than their willingness 
to pay for it when they do not own it).   
The third assumption is that behavior is risk averse toward gains (as in standard theory) and risk 
seeking toward losses.  It is motivated by experiments in which individuals choose a gamble with a 50% 
chance of losing $1000 over a certainty of losing $500.  This assumption receives some though not total 
support (Thaler and Johnson 1990), and has not been central to Prospect Theory’s development.   
The fourth assumption of Prospect Theory is quite important.   That is the assumption of an inverted 
S-shaped  function  converting  objective  probabilities  into  decision  weights,  that  blows  up  low 
probabilities and shrinks high ones (but not certainty).   The evidence used to justify this assumption is 
the excessive weights people attach to highly unlikely but extreme events: they pay too much for lottery 
tickets, overpay for flight insurance at the airport, or fret about accidents at nuclear power plants.  KT 
use  probability  weighting  heavily  in  their  paper,  adding  several  functional  form  assumptions 
(subcertainty, subadditivity) to explain various forms of the Allais paradox.  In the book, Kahneman does 
not talk about these extra assumptions, but without them Prospect Theory explains less.    
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To me, the stable probability weighting function is problematic.   Take low probability events.  Some 
of the times, as in the cases of plane crashes or jackpot winnings, people put excessive weight on them, 
a phenomenon incorporated into Prospect Theory that Kahneman connects to the availability heuristic.  
Other times, as when investors buy AAA-rated mortgage backed securities, they neglect low probability 
events, a phenomenon sometimes described as black swans (Taleb 2007).  Whether we are in the 
probability weighting function or the black swan world depends on the context: whether or not people 
recall and are focused on the low probability outcome. 
More broadly, how people think about the problem influences probability weights and decisions.  In 
one  of  KT’s  most  famous  examples,  results  from  two  potential  treatments  of  a  rare  disease  are 
described, alternatively, in terms of lives saved and lives lost.   The actual outcomes – gains and losses of 
life  --  are  identical  in  the  two  descriptions.    Yet  respondents  choose  the  “safer”  treatment  when 
description is in terms of lives saved, and the “riskier” treatment when description is in terms of lives 
lost.    The  framing  or  representation  of  the  problem  thus  changes  probability  weights  even  when 
objective outcomes are identical.  In another study, Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) show that decision 
weights depend on how “affect-rich” the outcomes are, and not just on their probabilities.  Bordalo, 
Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012a) present a model in which attention is drawn to salient, or unusual, 
payoffs.  In their model, unlike in Prospect Theory, individuals overweigh only low probability events 
that are associated with extreme, or salient, payoffs.   The model explains all the same findings as 
Prospect Theory, but also several additional ones, including preference reversals (people sometimes 
prefer A to B, but are willing to pay more for B than for A when considering the two in isolation).  
Kahneman of course recognizes the centrality of context in shaping mental representation of problems 
when he talks about the WYSIATI principle (what you see is all there is).    
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Prospect Theory is an enormously useful model of choice because it accounts for so much evidence 
and because it is so simple.   Yet it achieves its simplicity by setting to one side both in its treatment of 
reference points and its model of probability weights precisely the System 1 mechanisms that shape 
how a problem is represented in our minds.  For a more complete framework, we need better models of 
System 1.   
Prospect Theory has been widely used in economics, and many of the applications are described in 
Della Vigna (2010) and Barberis (2012).  Finance is no exception.  Benartzi  and Thaler (1995) have 
argued,  for  example,  that  it  can  explain  the  well-known  equity  premium  puzzle,  the  empirical 
observation that stocks on average earn substantially higher returns than bonds.  Benartzi and Thaler 
observed that while stocks do extremely well in the long run, they can fall a lot in the short run.  When 
investors have relatively short horizons, and also, in line with Prospect Theory, are loss averse, this risk 
of  short  term  losses  in  stocks  looms  large,  makes  stocks  unattractive,  and  therefore  cheap,  thus 
explaining the equity premium.   More recently, Barberis and Huang (2008) argue that the probability 
weighting function of Prospect Theory has the further implication that investors are highly attracted to 
positive skewness in returns, since they place excessive weights on unlikely events.  The evidence on 
overpricing of Initial Public Offerings and out of the money options is consistent with this prediction.   
            
IV.  What’s Ahead? 
In  conclusion,  let  me  briefly  mention  three  directions  in  which  I  believe  the  ship  launched  by 
Kahneman and Tversky is headed, at least in economics.  First, although I did not talk much about this in 
the review, Kahneman’s book on several occasions discusses the implications of his work for policy.  At 
the  broadest  level,  how  should  economic  policy  deal  with  System  1  thinking?    Should  it  respect  
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individual preferences as distinct from those dictated by the standard model or even by the laws of 
statistics?  Should it try to debias people to get them to make better decisions? 
I have avoided these questions in part because they are extremely tricky, at both philosophical and 
practical levels (Bernheim and Rangel 2009).  But one theme that emerges from Kahneman’s book 
strikes me as important and utterly convincing.  Faced with bad choices by consumers, such as smoking 
or undersaving, economists as System 2 thinkers tend to focus on education as a remedy.   Show people 
statistics on deaths from lung cancer, or graphs of consumption drops after retirement, or data on 
returns on stocks versus bonds, and they will do better.  As we have come to realize, such education 
usually fails.  Kahneman’s book explains why: System 2 might not really engage until System 1 processes 
the message.  If the message is ignored by System 1, it might never get anywhere.  The implication, 
clearly understood by political consultants and Madison Avenue advertisers, is that effective education 
and persuasion must connect with System 1.   Calling the estate tax “the death tax” may work better to 
galvanize its opponents than statistics on hard-working American farmers who may have to pay.  Thaler 
and Sunstein’s (2008) Nudge advocates policies that simplify decisions for people relying on System 1 in 
situations such as saving for retirement where even an educated System 2 might struggle.  
Beyond  the  changing  thinking  on  economic  policy,  Kahneman’s  work  will  continue  to  exert  a 
growing influence on our discipline.  A critical reason for this is the rapidly improving quality of economic 
data, from the field, from experiments, and from field experiments.  Confronted with the realities of 
directly  observed  human  behavior  –  financial  choices  made  by  investors,  technology  selection  by 
farmers,  insurance  choices  by  the  elderly  –  economists  have  come  to  psychology  for  explanations, 
especially to the work described in Kahneman’s book.  Rapidly expanding data on individual choices is 
the behavioral economist’s best friend.  
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But it seems to me that some of the most important advances in the near future both need to come, 
and will come, in theory.  Economics, perhaps like any other discipline, advances through changes in 
standard models: witness the enormous influence of Prospect Theory itself.   In contrast, we do not have 
a standard model of heuristics and biases, and as I argued, Prospect Theory is still a work in progress.  
Fortunately,  the  broad  ideas  discussed  in  Kahneman’s  book,  and  in  particular  his  emphasis  on  the 
centrality of System 1 thinking, provide some critical clues about the features of the models to come.  
In particular, the main lesson I learned from the book is that we represent problems in our minds, 
quickly and automatically, before we solve them.  Such representation is governed by System 1 thinking, 
including  involuntary  attention  drawn  to  particular  features  of  the  environment,  focus  on  these 
features, and recall from memory of data associated with these perceptions.   Perhaps the fundamental 
feature of System 1 is that what our attention is drawn to, what we focus on, and what we recall, is not 
always what is most necessary or needed for optimal decision making.   Some critical information is 
ignored; other -- less relevant – information receives undue attention because it stands out.  In this 
respect,  the  difference  from  the  models  of  bounded  rationality,  in  which  information  is  optimally 
perceived, stored, and retrieved is critical.  System 1 is automatic and reactive, not optimizing.  
As a consequence, when we make a judgment or choice, we do that on the basis of incomplete and 
selected data assembled via a System 1-like mechanism.   Even if the decisions are optimal at this point 
given what we have in mind, they might not be optimal given the information potentially available to us 
both from the outside world and from memory.   By governing what we are thinking about, System 1 
shapes what we conclude, even when we are thinking hard.   
Kahneman’s book, and his lifetime work with Tversky, had and will continue to have enormous 
impact on  psychology,  applied  economics, and  policy  making.    Theoretical  work on  Kahneman and  
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Tversky’s ideas has generally modeled particular heuristics and choices under risk separately, without 
seeking common elements.  A potentially large benefit of Kahneman’s book is to suggest a broader 
theme, namely that highly selective perception and memory shape what comes to mind, before we 
make decisions and choices.   Nearly all the phenomena the book talks about share this common thread.  
In this way, Kahneman points toward critical ingredients of a more general theory of intuitive thinking, 
still an elusive, but perhaps achievable, goal.    
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